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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of a landowner's duty to guard against criminal attack has not been
easy for courts and legislatures to define explicitly. Statutory definition in this realm
is rare;' courts are forced to make difficult choices between competing interests in
attempting to delineate the parameters of liability. The doctrine of foreseeability is
one means of limiting liability used by courts in this context. Foreseeability is a key
element in formulating any legal duty;2 a landowner ordinarily has no obligation to
guard against unlawful acts 3 of third persons until he has reasonable grounds to
anticipate such acts.4 Therefore, the majority of courts in this country impose a duty
upon the landowner only in specific situations which clearly indicate that criminal
conduct is foreseeable. 5 The most common situation triggering the duty is the
occurrence of prior criminal attacks on the premises. 6 This concept will be referred
to as the "prior similar incidents rule. ' 7 However, a recent California Supreme Court
1. In some instances, states have passed statutes or regulations requiring maintenance of "safe" premises. The
measures required by statute have been imposed upon landlords in the typical landlord/tenant relationship; hence, they are
outside the scope of this Article. See infra note 14. Furthermore, these statutes have not been generally interpreted to
impose a duty to guard against criminal attack. Rather, they are usually mere codifications of standards regarding the
physical condition of the premises. In order to serve as the basis for a landowner's liability, a statute, regulation, or
ordinance must specifically require owners to undertake particular security measures. Gibbins & Pan, Landlords and
Third Party Criminal Conduct, 22 Trial 48 (March 1986). See, e.g., Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231
(D.C. App. 1971); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Nixon v. Mr.
Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (duty imposed upon apartment house owner by statute to keep all
doors and windows of a vacant structure securely closed deemed to have been breached; therefore, defendant held liable
for rape committed by third party); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214,412 A.2d 436 (1980) (landlord's liability to tenant
who was mugged in hallway of apartment complex premised on landlord's failure to comply with regulation requiring
locks on entrance doors).
2. Foreseeability is relevant in defining the limits of both duty and proximate cause. See generally W. PRossER &
P. KEETON, THE Lw OF TeRS § 43, at 284-90 (5th ed. 1984); Browder, The Taming of a Duo-The Tort Liablity of
Landlords, 81 Micu. L. REv. 99, 151 (1982) ("the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.
(quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)).
3. Throughout this Article, "unlawful acts," "criminal attack," "criminal incidents," and "criminal conduct"
will be used interchangeably. The scope of these terms is intended to encompass most intentional crimes resulting in
physical harm to persons. Homocide, felonious assault, assault, kidnapping, and rape are included. In general, any attack
which is not direct and personal is excluded. However, such crimes against property may be included in determining
whether prior similar incidents have occurred. See infra note 7.
4. See ResrAseserr (SEcoND) orToRes § 344 comment f(1965). "[The possessor] ... is ordinarily under no duty
to exercise any care until he knows he has reason to know that the acts of third persons are occurring, or about to occur."
5. Comment, Business Inviters' Duty to Protect Invitees From Criminal Acts, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 883, 891
(1986).
6. See. e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Johstoneaux, 395 So. 2d 599 (Fla. App. 1981); McClendon v. Citizens
& Southern Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 272 S.E.2d 592 (1980); Taylor v. Hocker, 101111. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d
662 (1981); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture,
303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). In each of these cases, recovery for the plaintiff was conditioned to a large extent
on the occurrence of prior similar incidents which gave rise to the defendant's duty. See also Meadows v. Friedman R.R.
Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. App. 1983) (evidence that the business premises were in a high crime area
did not give rise to a duty to protect, absent allegations of specific prior crimes on the premises); Gillot v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454 (D.C. 1981) (finding no duty because no history of rapes in the area of
attack).
7. The rule has been applied with varying degrees of rigidity. Some courts do not explicitly distinguish between
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decision has departed from this rigid rule which in the past barred the victim's
recovery in the absence of prior similar incidents. 8 In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital,9 the court rejected an exclusive application of the prior similar incidents
rule and instead focused its inquiry upon the total factual setting of the case.
Accordingly, the absence of prior similar incidents did not preclude plaintiff's
recovery as a matter of law. 10 The court concluded that prior similar incidents, though
helpful, are not essential to establish foreseeability.II
Judicial decisions in Ohio condition landowner liability upon a finding that prior
criminal incidents have occurred.' 2 Such incidents provide the landowner with the
requisite notice that criminal attacks may be likely. The notion that a commercial
landowner is not an insurer of the safety of business invitees underlies much of the
judicial thought in this area of Ohio law.' 3 However, the Ohio Supreme Court has not
yet rendered an opinion on this subject.
The general justification for imposing a duty upon the landowner to guard
against criminal attacks is examined in this Article. This Article also analyzes the
propriety of abandoning the prior similar incidents rule because (1) foreseeability is
incapable of strict definition, (2) application of the rule usurps the historical function
of the jury, and (3) the rule undermines important social and economic policies.
Finally, this Article explores the contours of Ohio law in this area and advocates that
the Ohio Supreme Court reject the prior similar incidents rule and adopt the
"totality-of-the-circumstances" approach espoused in Isaacs.
the nature of the previous occurrences of criminal conduct on the premises in implementing the prior similar incidents rule.
Other courts vary along a continuum, with the most stringent approach requiring the same crime to occur in essentially
the same manner before a duty will be imposed. See, e.g., Townsley v. Cincinnati Gardens, Inc., 39 Ohio App. 2d 5.
314 N.E.2d 406 (1973) (requiring occurrence of prior similar incidents occurring at the same location and under nearly
identical circumstances); Uihlein v. Albertson's, Inc., 282 Or. 631, 580 P.2d 1014 (1978) (location in high crime area
and previous shoplifting at store not sufficient to create likelihood of criminal attack upon store patron); Fernandez v.
Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 386 So. 2d 4 (Fla. App. 1980) (requiring "like crimes of violence"); Butler v. Acme Markets, 89
N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (landowner held liable for patron's assault in light of seven muggings within past several
months); Taylor v. Dixon, 8 Ohio App. 3d 161, 456 N.E.2d 558 (1982) (seven prior robberies held not to be notice of
possible shooting in course of the eighth robbery); Taylor v. Hocker, 101 I11. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d 662 (1981)
(knowledge of crimes against property is not sufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers against physical assaults);
Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (77 car thefts and 15 attempted car thefts, although property
crimes, were sufficient to put landowner on notice of likelihood of personal attack); McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590,
302 S.E.2d 130 (1983) (two prior crimes occurring on the premises but not in the parking lot insufficient to constitute
foreseeability; incidents compared must be "substantially similar"); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 274 S.E.2d
265 (N.C. App. 1981) (requisite notice not properly attributed to landowner for assualt on patron where 36 criminal
incidents had occurred, but only six were characterized as assaults on the person). The Foster case subsequently was
reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court, which held the question of the landowner's notice was for resolution by
the jury; therefore summary judgment was improper. See Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281
S.E.2d 36 (1981).
8. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). Courts in
contexts other than that considered in this Article, see infra note 14, particularly in the landlord/tenant relationship, have
also held that plaintiffs may establish foreseeability other than by evidence of prior similar incidents. See, e.g.. Dick v.
Great South Bay Co., 106 Misc. 2d 686, 435 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co.,
123 Cal. App. 2d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981); Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. App. 1985).
9. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
10. Id. at 131, 695 P.2d at 662, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
11. Id. at 135, 695 P.2d at 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
12. See, e.g., Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 458 N.E.2d 471 (1981); Townsley v. Cincinnati
Gardens, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 1, 314 N.E.2d 406 (1973), rev'd, 39 Ohio App. 2d 5, 314 N.E.2d 409 (1974).
13. Howard v. Rogers, 19 Ohio St. 2d 42, 47, 249 N.E.2d 804, 807 (paragraph 2 of the syllabus) (1969).
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. The Landowner's Duty to Provide Protection Against Criminal Attack
The relationship between a landowner 4 and business patrons' 5 who enter the
land gives rise to the owner's duty to protect the patrons against an unreasonable risk
of physical harm.16 Yet, in spite of the traditional duty imposed upon commercial
landowners to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, American courts
initially were reluctant to hold a landowner liable for criminal acts occurring on the
premises. 17 Historically, a private individual had no duty to protect another from a
criminal attack. 18 At common law, courts were reluctant to impose liability for
nonfeasance; 19 in addition, the failure to impose liability may also be attributed to
basic principles of tort law. 20 A finding of duty is essential to recovery in a negligence
action. 2' Foreseeability is thought to define duty; hence, if an act is deemed
unforeseeable, a duty is never established. 22 Refusal to extend liability to landowners
for criminal acts of third persons was thus based on the perception that criminal acts
were unforeseeable; therefore, no duty to guard against such acts ever arose.
14. For purposes of this Article, the scope of the term "landowner" or "possessor of land" will be limited. The
term shall be used to mean the owner of establishments held open for commercial use, such as shopping malls, retail
establishments, sports arenas, hospitals. Specifically excluded, although related, are cases dealing with the landlord/
tenant, innkeeper/guest, and carrier/passenger relationships.
15. The term "patron" is used here to encompass those members of the public who enter in response to the
landowner's explicit or implicit invitation. These individuals were traditionally classified as "invitees." See REsrAT.-%iNr
(SEcoNO) OF TORTS § 322(3) (1965). However, use of this term is avoided due to the number of jurisdictions which have
abolished the status classifications in favor of a single duty of care. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443
P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mile
High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97 (D.C.
App. 1972); Bums v. Bradley, 120 N.J. 542, 419 A.2d 1069 (1980); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868
(1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
16. See REsTATE Nr (SECoND) OF TORTS § 314A(3) (1965).
17. Absent a specific relationship between the parties such as innkeeper/guest, carrier/passenger, or inviter/invitee,
the traditional common law approach rejected any assertion that private parties have any duty at all to guard against
criminal attack. Id. at § 314. Several reasons have been advanced to justify judicial reluctance to interfere with the
traditional "no duty" rule. Such reasons include failure to satisfy the requisites of the negligence cause of action because
the criminal act was viewed as an intervening cause of harm, the act was deemed unforeseeable, or the vagueness of the
standard of care prevented adequate assessment of the defendant's conduct. Furthermore, unfavorable economic
consequences and the fear of contravening the policy that the protection of citizens is the duty of the government also
contributed to the failure to impose liablity. Comment, supra note 5, at 889; Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.
1975).
Another commentator has advanced several explanations for courts' resistance to the duty. Professor Zacharias has
drawn on theories advanced by several scholars to conclude that three possible explanations exist to justify this judicial
reluctance: (I) liability contravenes economic theory by skewing resource allocation; (2) the inherent unfairness in forcing
private parties to take measures or accept responsibility for actions beyond their control; and (3) process concerns that
recognition of the duty would create, such as increased litigation and lack of institutional competency to resolve issues.
Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1986).
18. See REsrATLrA" (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). See also Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection:
Landowners' Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIz. L. Rv. 727, 735 (1979).
19. See REsrATiENr (Srcoo) OF ToRTs § 314 comment c (1965).
20. Note, Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of Another, 18 GA. L. REv. 361, 364 (1983).
21. In order to establish negligence, one must show the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and the injury
resulting therefrom. Feldman v. Howard, 10 Ohio St. 2d 189, 226 N.E.2d 564 (1967); W. PRossER & P. KsEro, supra
note 2, § 30 at 164-65 (elements of the negligence cause of action include duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause,
actual loss or damage).
22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Modem judicial thought invokes a somewhat more flexible analysis, and the
Second Restatement of Torts illustrates the reluctance to retain the earlier rule of
"unforeseeability per se. '"23 The Restatement indicates in Section 302B that "[a]n
act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or
a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is
criminal." 24 Most courts have moved away from the common law approach and now
permit recovery against landowners in instances where criminal attack is reasonably
foreseeable. 25 The Restatement codifies this principle in Section 344, specifically
pertaining to commercial landowners. The section provides:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose,
for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third
persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning
adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.z6
Section 344 may be considered the starting point in any duty analysis of this type.27
B. The Prior Similar Incidents Rule to Establish Foreseeabilty
Imposition of a duty to provide reasonable protection and the evolution of the
prior similar incidents rule can be attributed, in part, to an analogous area of law:
landlord/tenant law.2 8 The leading case in the area of liability for criminal attack in
landlord/tenant law is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.29 In Kline,
23. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 698-99 (Section 344 acknowledges changing trend). See infra text accompanying
note 26.
24. See REsrATmxEr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965).
25. Comment, supra note 5, at 891 ("The majority of courts that have considered inviters' liability are unwilling
to say that a business inviter never has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect invitees from criminal acts.").
Recovery, however, is not universal. Despite the fact that landowner liability for criminal attack has increased
recently, some courts still remain reluctant to impose liability on landlords. See Gibbins & Pan, supra note 1, at 48. See
also Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976) (no duty found due to lack of causal relationship);
Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. App. 1976) (duty to prevent robbery did not arise, even if it were
foreseeable); Comment, supra note 5, at 889-90.
26. See RSTATEENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
27. Section 344 appears to be a more particularized codification of the principle expressed in Section 302B. Section
302B provides: "An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which intended to cause harm, even
though such conduct is criminal." Essentially, Section 302B stands for the broad proposition that an actor will not be
absolved of liability for acts posing an unreasonable risk of harm to another, even if the harm is brought about by a third
party. Liability under Section 302B turns, however, upon foreseeable intervention of the third party, and a finding of
negligence will not be precluded even though the foreseeable conduct is intentional or criminal. See RrATE M, (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 302B (1965). Section 344 specifically applies this general doctrine to the commercial landowner.
28. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 740. Professor Bazyler discusses the similarities between the two relationships:
"Both are possessors of land, which they operate for commercial purposes. Both deal with clients who come with the
expectation of obtaining security as consideration for payment. Both have better knowledge about the crime problem."
Id. at 740, n.77. See also Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (landlordltenant principles
apply to commercial shopkeeper context).
29. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Professor Bazyler described Kline as "It]he major case standing for the
recognition of these factors, and consequent establishment of this duty." Bazyler, supra note 18, at 741. See also
Zacharias, supra note 17, at 699 (describing Kline as the "seminal case" in the development of liability for failure to take
security measures).
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a tenant was assaulted in a common hallway of an apartment building. 30 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the landlord liable
for failure to take reasonable steps to protect tenants from attack. 3' The decision was
based, among other factors, on the landlord's notice of repeated criminal assaults and
robberies in the common areas of the building. 32 Furthermore, the court stressed the
landlord's exclusive exercise of control over these areas. 33 The Kline decision,
however, offered little guidance as to predictable standards of foreseeability. 34
Accordingly, many of the cases following Kline focused upon determining what
constitutes notice sufficient to impose a duty. 35
Since Kline, most jurisdictions have required the occurrence of prior similar
incidents on the landowner's premises before the possibility of criminal attack
becomes sufficiently foreseeable to warrant imposition of a duty. 36 The Supreme
Court of Maryland expressed the major thrust of the prior similar incidents rule in
Scott v. Watson.37 The court stated: "[Tihis duty arises primarily from criminal
activities existing on the landlord's premises, and not from knowledge of general
criminal activities in the neighborhood. ' '38
Ohio has declined to follow Kline in the context of landlord/tenant law.39 In
Thomas v. Hart Realty, Inc.,4° recognition of a common law duty imposed upon
landlords to provide reasonable protection against entry into separately rented
apartments was rejected. 4' The court refused to impose a duty even in light of
"foreseeable entries in a 'high crime area. '42 The court distinguished Kline because
the criminal activity did not take place in a common area of the complex which was
under the landlord's exclusive control. 43 Furthermore, unlike the relationship of
business inviter and invitee, the relationship of landlord and tenant does not
traditionally give rise to a duty of reasonable protection. 44 Consequently, the court
30. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 487.
32. Id. at 483.
33. Id. at 482-83.
34. This ambiguity is particularly apparent in light of the language in Kline noting that the landlord is "not an
insurer" of the tenant's safety. Id. at 487.
35. Note, Landlord Liability to Tenants for Crimes of a Third Party: The Status in Florida, 6 NovA L.J. 145, 150
(1981).
36. For a general application of the prior similar incidents rule, see supra note 7. See also Relyea v. State, 385 So.
2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980) (plaintiffs could not recover against landowner for murder occurring on university grounds,
absent a showing of prior similar criminal acts); School Bd. of Palm Beach County v. Anderson, 411 So. 2d 940 (Fla.
App. 1982) (occurrence of prior similar assaults was sufficient to raise jury question in action against county school board
for injury suffered on high school campus); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976) (landlord held liable
where previous criminal activity had occurred on the premises).
37. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
38. Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
39. See Thomas v. Hart Realty Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 83, 477 N.E.2d 668 (1984). The Kline rationale, although
rejected in the realm of landlorditenant law, has been applied by Ohio courts in the context of the business inviterlinvitee
relationship. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The current status of Ohio law requires prior criminal activity on
the premises in order to give rise to the landowner's duty. Id.
40. 17 Ohio App. 3d 83, 477 N.E.2d 668 (1984).
41. Id., 477 N.E.2d at 669.
42. Id. at 85, 477 N.E.2d at 670.
43. Id., 477 N.E.2d at 670.
44. Id., 477 N.E.2d at 670.
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concluded that abandonment of the traditional landlord/tenant duties which arise from
the contractual terms of the lease, properly lies with the legislature. 45
A minority of courts since Kline, including cases outside the area of landlord/
tenant law, have held criminal acts to be foreseeable even in the absence of prior
similar incidents on the premises. 46 These decisions apply a less rigid standard of
foreseeability, implying notice from the circumstances in general. 47 For instance, the
United States Supreme Court held in Lillie v. Thompson48 that the presence of a large
number of vagrants within defendant's train station rendered attacks on individuals
foreseeable.49 The Court was not applying the law of any state; rather, recovery was
afforded under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 50 The decision in Lillie,
therefore, can be distinguished because it rested on a statutory duty of employers to
provide a safe place to work, and did not require recognition of a general duty in tort
to provide adequate protection.5 '
In addition to expansion and definition of the scope of foreseeability, some
jurisdictions have expanded upon the Kline rationale to increase the scope of duty in
the commercial setting.5 2 The duty of protection was introduced into the commercial
realm in Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building.53 In Samson, the court deter-
mined that liability could be imposed upon the landlord for injuries to the plaintiff,
who was attacked by a mental patient in an elevator.54 (A portion of the premises was
also leased to a state mental health clinic.) The court held that negligent conduct
could be established in the absence of prior similar incidents if a landowner fails to
investigate the risk and extent of the crime problem.5 5 Samson can be distinguished
from the inviter/invitee relationship considered here because the defendant was a
commercial lessor, thereby invoking the landlord/tenant relationship. This distinction
was emphasized in the court's discussion of the landlord's traditional duty over
common areas of the building. 56 Samson is important, however, because it illustrates
at least one court's willingness to abandon the prior similar incidents rule in favor of
a "totality-of-the circumstances" approach. Furthermore, the analysis occurs in a
quasi-commercial setting.
45. Id. at 86, 477 N.E.2d at 671.
46. See Green Companies v. Divincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. App. 1983) (holding that notice of reported crimes
in the area, combined with an overall reduction in security, was sufficient to hold the landlord liable even with no history
of prior crimes in the building). See also Morris v. Barnette, 553 So. 2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that location,
mode of business, observation, and past experience were sufficient notice to hold washateria operator liable). Note that
the Isaacs court went even further than Barnette, because in Isaacs, the plaintiff did not present evidence on all four
Barnette factors, yet the court nevertheless held the evidence sufficient to hold the landowner liable.
47. O'Donnell, Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants-The New Duty to Protect from Foreseeable
Attack, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 979, 992 (1984). In Morris v. Barnette, 553 So. 2d 648, 650 (rex. Civ. App. 1977), the
court listed four modes available to prove the foreseeability of a third party's criminal conduct on the premises.
48. 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
49. Id. at 460-61 (citing Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1983)).
50. Id. at 460.
51. Id.
52. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 743-44.
53. 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975). Although Samson did involve a landlord/tenant relationship, it was
that of a commercial landlord leasing property for business purposes.
54. Id. at 398-99, 224 N.W.2d at 845.
55. Id. at 404-07, 224 N.W.2d at 848-49.
56. Id. at 407. 224 N.W.2d at 849.
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III. OHIO LAW: BACKGROUND
There is not a great deal of Ohio law in the area of tort liability for the criminal
acts of another. The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to determine the existence and
extent of any duty of commercial landowners in this area, although several lower
courts have confronted the issue.57
In Holdshoe v. Whinery,58 the Ohio Supreme Court first imposed liability upon
a defendant for the conduct of a third person. In Holdshoe, the plaintiff patron was
injured on defendant's picnic premises when an unattended automobile rolled down
a hill and struck her.59 The court held that the "[d]efendant, as an owner and occupier
of land,... owes plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the negligent acts
of third parties which could harm the plaintiff where the defendant knows or should
know that such acts are likely to occur.'"'6 After determining that plaintiff's status
was that of a business invitee, 6t the court premised the imposition of duty upon
Section 344 of the Restatement. 62 It is significant to note, however, that the court
deleted any reference to accidental or intentional acts of third persons in its citation
to Section 344.63 Therefore, a narrow reading of Holdshoe suggests that a duty exists
merely to guard against negligent and not criminal acts of third persons.64 To date,
the Ohio Supreme Court has not expressed an opinion as to whether Section 344 has
been adopted in whole or in part.
The following year, the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether
to further extend the developing third-party liability law. In Howard v. Rogers,65 the
plaintiff was accidentally injured when a fight broke out at a high school dance. 66 The
supreme court, following Holdshoe, clearly recognized that an occupier of premises
for business purposes67 may be held liable for harm caused to a business invitee by
the conduct of third persons. 68 The court nevertheless stressed that the landowner is
"not an insurer of the safety of his business invitees while they are on those
premises. "69 Hence, the landowner is not liable for an unknown danger which causes
injury. 70 The decision of the trial court was reversed and judgment was rendered for
57. See, e.g., supra note 12.
58. 14 Ohio St. 2d 134, 237 N.E.2d 127 (1968).
59. Id. at 135, 237 N.E.2d at 128.
60. Id. at 138, 237 N.E.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
61. Note that Ohio still retains the traditional status classifications of trespasser, licensee, and business invitee for
purposes of determining the landowner's duty of care. See, e.g., DiGildo v. Caponi, 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732
(1969) (court postponed determining whether status categories should be abolished); Moore v. Denune & Pipic, Inc., 26
Ohio St. 2d 125, 269 N.E.2d 599 (1971). See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
62. See REsTATwiENT (SECoND) oF Topas § 344 (1965).
63. Holdshoe v. Whinery, 14 Ohio St. 2d 134, 137, 237 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1968).
64. See Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 3, 458 N.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1981).
65. 19 Ohio St. 2d 42, 249 N.E.2d 804 (1969).
66. Id. at 43, 249 N.E.2d at 805.
67. One of the defendants held liable was a corporation doing business as Teensville, U.S.A. This defendant
sponsored and conducted the dance for profit by charging an admission fee. Teensville, U.S.A. clearly was an occupier
of the premises for business purposes. Id. at 46, 249 N.E.2d at 807.
It also appears (although it is unclear from the opinion) that the owners of the school gymnasium where the dance
was held were also named defendants.
68. Id. at 46-47, 249 N.E.2d at 807.
69. Id. at 47, 249 N.E.2d at 807.
70. Id., 249 N.E.2d at 807.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
defendants because the likelihood of fighting at a teenage dance was deemed
unforeseeable under the circumstances. 7'
The Howard court's failure to impose liability was premised upon lack of
foreseeability; 72 yet it is unclear to what extent the court intended to limit the scope
of foreseeability. The confusion exists in light of the court's discussion of comment
f to Section 344 of the Restatement, 73 which provides in part that no duty exists until
the landowner "knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are
about to occur.'' 74 A victim's recovery would be circumscribed to a degree even
greater than that of the prior similar incidents rule if such a narrow reading of the
Howard decision were adopted.75 Support for this position can be gleaned from the
court's failure to discuss the portion of comment f which relies on past experience as
a means of assessing foreseeability. 76
However, the opinion suggests that the owners would have been liable if the
probability of fights at teenage dances reasonably could have been foreseen. 77 The
court stressed the absence of conduct at any other teenage dances in the area which
would have alerted the defendant to the likelihood of such an occurrence. 78 Thus, the
prior similar incidents rule, not whether the act was occurring or about to occur,
served as an unarticulated measure of foreseeabilty.
Landowner liability for criminal or intentional7 9 acts of third parties was first
explored by the lower courts in Townsley v. Cincinnati Gardens, Inc.80 In Townsley,
the prior similar incidents rule was rigidly invoked, thus illustrating the court's
reluctance to impose liability upon the landowner in the absence of very specific
evidence serving to put the landowner on notice. Strict application of the doctrine
foreclosed plaintiff's recovery for a physical assault which occurred in the washroom
of the defendant's sports arena.8 ' Testimony at the trial level indicated that although
71. Id. at 48, 249 N.E.2d at 807.
72. Id. at 47-48, 249 N.E.2d at 807. The court stated, "In the instant case, there is no evidence from which
reasonable minds could find that defendants either knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known of the
likelihood of a fight such as occurred at this dance." Id., 249 N.E.2d at 807.
73. See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRts § 344 comment f (1965). This comment provides:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care
until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur....
If the place or character of his business, or his past experience is such that he should reasonably anticipate
careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be
under a duty to take precautions against it, and to . . .afford a reasonable protection.
74. Id.
75. Several courts in jurisdictions outside of Ohio have adopted this limited duty rule. See, e.g., Henley v. Pizitz
Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272, 277 (Ala. 1984) (evidence of prior similar incidents insufficient because such evidence did
not show that defendant knew or had reason to know that the "acts [were] occurring or about to occur on the premises
that pose[d] imminent probability of harm to an invitee."); Kelly v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc., 417 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1982);
Munn v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 274 S.C. 529, 266 S.E.2d 414 (1980) (per curiam); Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d
188 (Tenn. 1975); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977) (patron could not
recover for attack in defendant's store because defendant storeowner did not know and had no reason to know of criminal
attack).
76. See supra note 73.
77. Howard v. Rogers, 19 Ohio St. 2d 42, 48, 249 N.E.2d 804, 807 (1969).
78. Id., 249 N.E.2d at 807.
79. Again, it should be stressed that although lower courts in Ohio have addressed the issue, the Ohio Supreme
Court has not ruled on the duty regarding criminal or intentional, as opposed to mere negligent, acts of third parties.
80. 39 Ohio Misc. 1, 314 N.E.2d 406 (1973), rev'd, 39 Ohio App. 2d 5, 314 N.E.2d 409 (1974).
81. 39 Ohio Misc. at 2. 314 N.E.2d at 407.
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no incidents exactly like the one at issue had occurred, similar assaults on defendant's
premises had taken place on previous occasions. 82 The trial court ruled in plaintiff's
favor, stating: "With the present state of the law and the current general threat of
violent crime, establishments such as the defendant may have to add to their security
forces to protect effectively their business invitees.' 83
The court of appeals in Townsley rejected this approach and determined that a
judgment against the owner was invalid in the absence of specific evidence
demonstrating that the owner "knew or could have reasonably anticipated that the
area of attack posed a danger to invitees." 8 4 The court recognized that prior instances
of assault had occurred in the sports arena; however, there was no specific evidence
of assaults in the washroom. 85 As a result, the trial court decision was overruled and
no liability was imposed. The requirement of prior notice was narrowly interpreted by
the court of appeals, which imposed a duty upon the landowner only when specific,
rather than general, notice was afforded. The court also emphasized that the
landowner may be required to increase security forces now that the owner has become
aware of the potential for such an occurrence. 86
Finally, a 1981 trial level decision, Daily v. K-Mart Corp.,87 provides a
comprehensive overview of the development of Ohio law in this area. The plaintiff
in this case was abducted and assaulted by two men at gunpoint from defendant
K-Mart's parking lot. 88 The court ruled that the occurrence of "forty-nine separate
incidents of serious crime" 89 in the ten years preceding this incident precluded
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 90 The presence of the earlier incidents
alerted K-Mart to the possibility of future criminal conduct, 9' and thereby gave rise
to defendant's duty to protect invitees from such attacks. Accordingly, the appropri-
ateness of defendant's actions in light of this duty was a question for the jury.92
Ohio law, therefore, is in accord with the majority of American jurisdictions. 93
The existence of a landowner's duty to guard against criminal attack is recognized if
such attack is foreseeable. The scope of the foreseeability doctrine in this area of law
is defined by the prior similar incidents rule. In no Ohio case has a duty been imposed
upon a landowner to guard against criminal attack in the absence of similar
occurrences on the premises. The remaining sections of this Article will advocate the
following refinements by the Ohio Supreme Court: (I) adoption of Secition 344 of the
82. Id. at 3, 314 N.E.2d at 408.
83. Id. at 4, 314 N.E.2d at 409.
84. 39 Ohio App. 2d at 5, 314 N.E.2d at 409 (syllabus by the court) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 8-9, 314 N.E.2d at 411.
86. Id. at 10, 314 N.E.2d at 412.
87. 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 458 N.E.2d 471 (1981).
88. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 472.
89. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 472. The opinion does not indicate what acts constituted "serious crime"; therefore, no
standard may be discerned regarding the degree of specificity required in implementing the prior similar incidents rle.
The court's failure to address this specific versus general notice dichotomy may demonstrate a willingness on the court's
part to construe the rule less restrictively than did the Townsley court.
90. Id. at 5, 458 N.E.2d at 476.
91. Id., 458 N.E.2d at 476.
92. Id. at 6, 458 N.E.2d at 476.
93. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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Restatement in its entirety, thereby conclusively recognizing a landowner's duty to
guard against criminal attack; and (2) abolition of any "per se" rule such as the prior
similar incidents rule for determining the issue of foreseeability. Ohio can assess the
strength of these proposals by examining their application in California, which has
adopted a consistent approach.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE "TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES" APPROACH
A. California Abandons the Prior Similar Incidents Approach
A 1985 California Supreme Court decision rejected strict application of the prior
similar incidents rule. In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,94 the plaintiff, Dr.
Isaacs, was shot and severely wounded by an unknown assailant on defendant's
premises. 95 No prior similar assaults had occurred in the parking lot where the
shooting took place; however, several threatened assaults and thefts had occurred in
the emergency room area directly across the street. 96 In addition, the hospital was
located in a high crime area, harassment was commonplace, and hospital security was
inadequate. 97 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the
grounds that the assault was not foreseeable without the occurrence of prior similar
crimes in the same or similar portion of the premises. 98 On appeal, the state's highest
court held that the absence of prior similar incidents did not foreclose Dr. Isaacs'
action as a matter of law. 99 Although prior similar incidents are helpful, the court
concluded that they are not essential to establish foreseeability. 10°
Prior to the Isaacs case, the overwhelming majority of California appellate
decisions strictly adhered to the prior similar incidents rule in several contexts,
including the commercial landowner context. 10 ' The California Supreme Court
abandoned rigid application of the rule in Isaacs, citing four major reasons:
(1) equating foreseeability of a particular act with previous occurrences of similar acts
is erroneous; 0 2 (2) the rule leads to arbitrary results and tenuous distinctions; 10 3
(3) strict application of the rule improperly removes too many cases from the jury's
consideration;' °4 and (4) the prior similar incidents rule undermines the policy of
preventing future harm and the policy of victim compensation. 105 The court's reasons
94. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
95. Id. at 120, 695 P.2d at 655, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
96. Id. at 121, 695 P.2d at 655-56, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
97. Id. at 121, 695 P.2d at 655-56, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
98. Id. at 123, 695 P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
99. Id. at 131-32, 695 P.2d at 663, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
100. Id. at 129, 695 P.2d at 661, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
101. See, e.g., Anaya v. Turk, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1092, 199 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1984); Jubert v. Shalom Realty, 135
Cal. App. 3d 1, 185 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1982); Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981); Wingard
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 37, 176 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1981); Jamison v. Mark C. Bloome Co., 112 Cal.
App. 3d 570, 169 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1980); Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134
Cal. Rptr. 29 (1977); Rogers v. Jones, 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1976) (all holding prior similar incidents
are required to establish foreseeability).
102. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 126, 695 P.2d 653, 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362.
103. Id. at 126, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
104. Id. at 126, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
105. Id. at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
[Vol. 48:247
PRIOR SIMILAR INCIDENTS RULE
in departing from mechanical application of the blanket rule are sound, in light of
public policy and established judicial principles. These four primary reasons
underlying the court's decision can be consolidated into the following categories of
judicial concern: (1) foreseeability is a flexible doctrine incapable of strict definition;
(2) application of the rule usurps the historical function of the jury; and (3) the rule
undermines important social and economic policies. An analysis of these consider-
ations and the strength of the Isaacs "totality-of-the-circumstances" position
follows.
B. Evaluation of the Isaacs Approach
1. Foreseeabilty is a Flexible Doctrine Incapable of Strict Definition
Foreseeability is a flexible doctrine that cannot be defined by a single standard
such as the prior similar incidents rule. The concept of foreseeabilty is by its very
nature a vague and nebulous principle. An "all-purpose" formula 0 6 as a means of
distinguishing the foreseeable from the unforeseeable generally is not applicable to
every instance. For example, although the occurrence of earlier criminal attacks late
at night on a landowner's premises may render future attacks foreseeable, the
occurrence of an attack in broad daylight with many patrons present may not subject
the landowner to liability. Reasonable protection may permit reduced security during
the "low-risk" hours; hence, the landowner may not be held to have breached a duty
under such circumstances. Conversely, a "reasonable landowner" may have
sufficient notice of the likelihood of attack from other factors even in the absence of
prior similar attacks. The likelihood of criminal conduct may be anticipated by reason
of location, mode of doing business, or observation of past experience. 10 7 In short,
what is reasonably foreseeable is not always subject to strict quantification. The
occurrence of prior similar incidents is not an exclusive means of placing a landowner
on notice of the need to protect visitors from criminal attack. A more logical inquiry
should focus upon the total factual setting of each case, 0 8 considering what actions
a reasonable landowner would have taken to reduce the risk of criminal conduct under
the circumstances. 09 Although actions which may or may not be considered
"reasonable" are arguably no easier to define than foreseeability, 1O at least the entire
106. Green, Foreseeabilty in Negligence Law, 61 CoLumi. L. REv. 1401, 1421 (1961). Professor Green, in his
discussion of foreseeability as a determinant of liability in negligence cases, observes that "the reasonable man and his
foresecability" are fictions created to exemplify the jury's judgment in assessing the factual situtation. Id. "Their
conversion into an 'all-purpose' formula for determining the problem of responsibility in its totality must prove a vain
attempt. It can not be sustained either as all inclusive or all exclusive over the broad area of negligence law." Id.
107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
108. Green, supra note 106, at 1417-20.
109. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 752.
110. In fact, one commentator has observed that "Ia]s a higher level of security becomes the norm, common
perceptions of how much security is 'reasonable' will adjust." Zacharias, supra note 17, at 704. See also Noble v. Los
Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 912, 916-17, 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (1985) (court noted that a jury's
evaluation of a landowner's security measures would only come into play once "the security in existence has already
proven to be inadequate to prevent the injury which did occur."). Such observations may prompt criticism of the Isaacs
approach by suggesting that higher standards will subject landowners to an impermissible risk of liability. The courts and
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factual setting is before the jury. Thus, the absence of prior similar occurrences
should not automatically defeat recovery by the plaintiff.
Such an analysis is particularly sound when compared with the analytical
approach taken in Rowland v. Christian, " ' a 1968 decision of the California Supreme
Court. Prior to the Rowland decision, a plaintiff's status as trespasser, licensee, or
invitee precluded the noncommercial landowner from suit in some cases."l2 Under
the traditional common law approach, the duty owed by a landowner to an individual
differed depending on whether the court classified the plaintiff as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee.113 Thus, consequences to the landowner for an identical act or
omission resulted in radically different outcomes merely as a result of the plaintiff's
court-determined classification. 14 The Rowland decision responded to this perceived
inequity by eliminating the common law status distinctions and replacing them with
a uniform standard of ordinary care." t5
The Rowland approach in delineating duty in the broader context of general
landowner liability is analogous to the duty-defining framework of the Isaacs court.
Both courts undermined the application of strict doctrines of "per se" rules as
duty-triggers. Just as the scope of a landowner's duty was defined by the plaintiff's
status under pre-Rowland law," 16 the prior similar incidents rule likewise prescribes
the contours of a commercial landowner's liability by demarcating foreseeability.
Each rule evolved to circumscribe the limits of a landowner's duty to persons entering
the premises. By analogy, therefore, many of the problems with the status rule
considered in the Rowland case are applicable to the prior similar incidents rule. "17
In Rowland, the court rejected blind application of the general rule, and
announced instead a balancing test to determine a landowner's duty irrespective of
status." 8 The court recognized that although a relationship generally exists between
legislatures, however, may implement other measures to guard against a legal rule which in effect makes the landowner
an "insurer" of the patron's safety. See infra notes 239-41, 245-51 and accompanying text.
111. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
112. Comment, The Death ofPalsgraf: A Comment on the Current Status of the Duty Concept in California, 16 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 793, 798 (1979).
113. The landowner's general duty to trespassers is stated in the REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRs, § 333'(1965).
Subject to specified exception, the landowner is not liable to trespassers for his negligent failure to maintain the land in
a reasonably safe condition; nor is he liable for his failure to exercise reasonable care in carrying out his activities. Thus,
the landowner generally owed no duty to a trespasser at common law except to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct.
J. PAGE, THE LAw OF PEpssE LIABLrry § 2.1, at 7 (1976 and Supp. 1985-86).
Section 342 of the Restatement specifies the landowner's duty to licensees. Landowners must either exercise
reasonable care in order to make the premises safe, or warn the licensee of any unreasonably dangerous condition, if the
licensee does not know or have reason to know of the risk involved. Furthermore, the landowner is required to exercise
reasonable care in order to avoid injury to a known licensee. See id., § 3.7, at 41.
As to invitees, the landowner owes a general duty of reasonable care to make the premises safe. Id., § 4.5, at 72;
RESrATEMtENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343 (1965).
114. J. PAGE, supra note 113, § 6.1 at 121-22.
115. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561,568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968). See generally J. PAGE, supra note 113,
§ 6.3 at 123-24; Note, Common Law Distinctions Between Licensee, Invitee, and Trespasser are Abolished in Calfrnia
and Replaced by a Standard of Ordinary Care, 14 Viu. L. REv. 360 (1969). "'[Rowland v. Christian] is the first case to
abolish completely the common law distinctions." Id. at 362.
116. See supra text accompanying note 113.
117. See generally Bazyler, supra note 18, at 738-39.
118. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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status and duty, status was not determinative of duty in all cases. 1 9 For instance,
"although foreseeability of harm to an invitee would ordinarily seem greater than
foreseeability of harm to a trespasser, in a particular case the opposite may be
true."- 20 Similarly, notice of prior similar incidents certainly has some bearing on the
issue of foreseeability, although the occurrence of such acts on the landowner's
premises should not be determinative.The rules were intended to provide guidelines
for flexible concepts such as duty and foreseeability; they should not be applied to
preclude considerations t2' which are essential to a proper resolution of the issues. ' 22
Proponents of continued reliance on established rules of status have attacked the
Rowland decision on the ground that elimination of the status classification results in
determining duty on a case-by-case basis.' 23 The dissent in Rowland stressed the
value of judicial certainty provided by the black-letter rules. 124 Justice Burke opposed
abandonment of the status classifications, arguing that the blanket categories with
their corresponding duties provided the courts with an established and workable
approach. ' 25 Under the majority's singular standard of care, fact-specific determina-
tions of liability without the benefit of prescribed standards or guidelines would
replace the "predictable" structure. Therefore, an argument in favor of retaining the
prior similar incidents rule submits that the rule performs a valuable function by
providing a stable set of guidelines to determine foreseeability. 26
However, any such mechanical theory of jurisprudence is inherently flawed. A
rigid limitation on the type of evidence permitted to establish foreseeability fosters
strained construction of the rule by the courts.' 27 The courts enjoy a great degree of
latitude in either narrowing or broadening the application of the rule's criteria in order
to arrive at a result consistent with the perceived equities in a particular case.' 28 The
introduction of evidence other than prior similar incidents will relieve courts of the
119. Id., 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
120. Id. at 117-18, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
121. The Rowland court discussed a number of considerations including the closeness of the connection between
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, foreseeability of harm, etc.
122. 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
123. Id. at 120, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Burke, J., dissenting).
124. Note, supra note 115, at 365 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 120, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 105 (Burke, J., dissenting)).
12. Note, supra note 115, at 365.
126. Although at first glance, there does appear to be some merit to this argument, one need only examine the great
disparity with which the prior similar incidents rule has been applied to determine that the argument is without merit. See
supra note 7. Courts have gone to considerable lengths to determine how "similar" the prior occurrences must be in order
to invoke the prior similar incidents rule. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
127. See supra note 7.
128. Id. The arbitrary effect of the prior similar incidents rule is illustrated by Taylor v. Hocker, 101 II1. App. 3d
639, 428 N.E.2d 662 (1981). In Taylor, the court adopted the view that a landowner's knowledge of crimes against
property does not give rise to the duty to protect against physical attack. Thus, application of the rule disregards any notice
the defendant may have received which should have alerted him to the potential for criminal conduct. If enough crimes
against property are committed, a reasonable landowner would be apprised of the need to implement some type of
security. The prior similar incidents rule can be criticized because "the reasonable business inviter's response to a rash
of property crimes may effectively prevent the occurrence of crimes against the person as well." Comment, supra note
5, at 906. See also Note, Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture: Duty of Mall Owners to Take Measures to Protect
Initee From CriminalActs, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 1126, 1138 (1982) ("Even if the facts had indicated that a patron's property
was the only interest threatened by defendant's alleged negligence, the fact that a different interest of the plaintiff was
actually injured should not allow an exculpation from liability.").
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difficult task of finding qualifications and exceptions to the rule, therefore eliminating
the tenuous qualitative and quantitative distinctions which have impeded forthright
judicial decisionmaking. 2 9
2. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Approach Preserves the Historical
Function of the Jury
Another important line of reasoning articulated in Isaacs reflects current
California judicial thought regarding the jury's role in assessing foreseeability. In
Weirum v. R.K.O. General, Inc.,130 foreseeability was held to be a question of fact
for the jury. ' 3' The court may decide foreseeability only if reasonable minds cannot
differ on undisputed facts. 1 32 The effect of the Weirum decision and its progeny 33 is
to limit the judge's authority to rule in defendant's favor on summary proceedings. 134
Ohio case law follows this general approach, consistently determining that resolution
of the foreseeability issue lies with the jury. 135
The Isaacs court's reasoning is supported by a recognition of the historical
function of the jury in general. Questions of fact are the jury's domain. 136 "Fact"
includes a determination of specfic standards of conduct for the parties under the
circumstances of the actual case. 137 "The cardinal concept is that of the reasonably
prudent man under the circumstances; what he would have observed; what dangers he
would have perceived; what he would have done; and the like." 38 Although outer
limits have been set by courts to control somewhat the scope of the jury's latitude,
courts traditionally have applied fixed judicial standards with restraint. 139
The jury as a "trier of fact" introduces the common sense of the "ordinary
man" into fact-finding.' 40 One notable role played by the jury is to "keep
administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community"
by "introduc[ing] into their verdict a certain amount ... of popular prejudice." 141
129. Note, supra note 115, at 367.
130. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
131. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
132. Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983).
133. See, e.g., Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978); Landeros v.
Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
134. Comment, supra note 112, at 804.
135. See, e.g., Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St. 2d 282, 423 N.E.2d 467 (1981); Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio
St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio App. 2d 320, 370 N.E.2d 480 (1977).
136. James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YAE L.J. 667, 667-68 (1949) (author observes
that "questions of law are for the court and questions of fact are for the jury," but notes the critical role that the court
plays in shaping what evidence is to be admitted in trial. Id. at 667-69); W. PRossm & P. KEEroi, supra note 2, §45, at
321 ("[l1n any case where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the foreseeability of a particular
risk, . . . the question is for the jury .... ").
137. James, supra note 136, at 676.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 677.
140. Id. at 685.
141. O.W. Hotims, Cot.Ec'ED LEoAL PAPERS, 237-38 (1921). Holmes, although questioning the jury's right to decide
appropriate standards of conduct as a theoretical matter, see id. at 236-37, nevertheless justifies the system because of
this very phenomenon: the jury's tendency to keep the law in accord with social needs. See also James, supra note 136,
at 686.
This important function of the jury implicitly serves as the basis for Professor Zacharias' political model of torts. See
generally Zacharias, supra note 17. Zacharias has articulated a theory which posits that judicial rules of liability evolve
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Strict application of rigid rules, such as the prior similar incidents rule, restricts the
jury's sphere by limiting the degree of latitude which is acceptable in deciding
questions of fact. t42 The effect of this restriction is to limit liability overall. t43
Conversely, the absence of specific court-prescribed standards operates to enlarge the
jury's role in assessing the defendant's conduct. As a result, the general scope of
liability tends to be extended. 144 The restrained liability fostered by the prior similar
incidents rule carries the negative consequences of preventing the jury from
performing one of its valuable functions, that of keeping the law receptive to
changing social needs. 145
Enlarging the degree of the jury's participation in evaluating foreseeability has
been criticized. One such objection highlights the problem of sympathetic juries. 146
In this context, jurors are particularly likely to side with the plaintiff. Although the
appropriate vehicle for vindication of the victim's injury more properly lies with the
criminal system, redress under the penal laws is extremely unlikely. 147 Hence, a
practical problem inherent in civil actions against landowners for failure to take
reasonable security measures is that the person who is directly responsible for the
plaintiff's harm is not a party to the action.148 Although the landowner is not directly
responsible for the plaintiff's injury, it is easy for jurors to hold the landowner
accountable by shifting the risk of loss away from the innocent victim.149 Juror
hostility toward the criminal, frustration with the imperfections in the criminal justice
system, and empathy with the victim are all factors which may play a role in jury
verdicts favoring liability.' 50 Finally, commercial defendants are likely to be
perceived as economically better able to bear the loss than are individuals. This
perception of the landowner as a "deep pocket" only serves to exacerbate the
problem of jury sympathy.' 5 1
However, the impact of jury sympathy in this area may be overemphasized.
There is no evidence to suggest that courts are less equipped to deal with the
possibility of bias in this context than in any other. The use of directed verdicts,
judgment n.o.v.'s, special interrogatories, and concise jury instructions can reduce
inequitable outcomes.' 52 Moreover, intimation that jurors are untrustworthy
in response to the pressures highlighted by a particular social problem. When compensation for a perceived social wrong
is inadequate, victims pressure courts for redress. Id. at 715-27. Under Zacharias' theory, ultimate resolution of the issue
may require legislative intervention.The liability rule therefore may be justified as an attempt to provoke this legislative
response. Thus, the jury may serve to alert the judiciary (and as a consequence, the legislature) to social needs.
142. James, supra note 136, at 678.
143. Id. at 688-89.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 689. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
146. See, e.g., Browder, supra note 2, at 153; Fager, Liability of Business Proprietors for Criminal Acts of Third
Persons, 29 FED. Iss. CouNs. Q. 29, 33 (1978); Zacharias, supra note 17, at 712; Bazyler, supra note 18, at 753.
147. In most cases, the identity of the assailant is unknown.
148. Fager, supra note 146, at 33.
149. Browder, supra note 2, at 153.
150. See Fager, supra note 146, at 33; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 713 n.93.
151. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 712, 713 n.93.
152. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 753. See also James, supra note 136, at 680-81 ("the law places principal reliance
upon the court's instructions to keep the jury within their theoretical bounds"). However, Professor James astutely
observes that "the instruction is an effective device only to the extent that it is actually followed by the jury." Id.
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decisionmakers is inconsistent with the use of the jury system in general.153 Finally,
other measures exist to eliminate the possibility of adverse consequences in extending
liability. 154 On balance, legal, social, and economic policy considerations suggest
that society's overall interests are best served by requiring landowners to guard
against criminal attack.
3. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Approach Advances Important Social and
Economic Policies
The ultimate effect of the Isaacs rule is to increase the risk of landowner liablity
for failure to guard against criminal attack. In determining that prior similar incidents
are not essential to establish foreseeability, 155 the Isaacs court created greater
opportunities for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the security measures
employed by the landowner. As discussed earlier, when the jury's role in evaluating
the defendant's conduct is enlarged, the general scope of liability tends to be
extended.' 56 The following discussion of the policy implications generated by
extending landowner liability illustrates the merit of the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach.
a. The Pervasiveness of the Crime Problem and the Landowner's Role in Crime
Prevention
Violent criminal attacks, especially prevalent in areas of high population
concentration, pose a serious social problem.157 Businesses and commercial estab-
lishments constitute a particular source of victimization.' 58 The problem persists,
despite law enforcement efforts and increased victim awareness. 159 Many commen-
tators suggest that the lack of adequate security exacerbates the crime problem. 60
Thus, one means of reducing the crime problem is to impose a legal duty on
landowners to provide protection against foreseeable attack. 16 1
Minimizing the opportunity for criminal attack is an effective approach which
should be utilized to prevent crime.162 The commercial landowner can implement a
153. No attempt is made here to argue the merits of the jury system; our current structure has strong opponents as
well as proponents. Clearly, though, the existence of the system supports the notion that the jury serves a valuable function
in our current legal system. See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
155. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 126, 695 P.2d 653, 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362
(1985).
156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
157. See C. JEFFREY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 215 (1971); W. SgKOGA & M. MA.IELD, COPING
WIT CRimE 28 (1981); Bazyler, supra note 18, at 727 (citing J. CoNKLLN, THE IMPAcr Or CRIME 3. 41 (1975)); Zacharias,
supra note 17, at 735.
158. See Bazyler, supra note 18, at 727-28 and sources cited therein; C. JEFFREY, supra note 157, at 214-15.
159. See generally U.S. DEFr. OF JusTIcE, BUREAU OF JUSTicE STATISTICS, OURCErOOK OF CRIMI1NAL JUSTIcE STATsISIcs -
1984 at 181-83; W. SKoGAN & M. MAxFIEw, supra note 157, at 11.
160. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 730 (citing W. CLIFFORD, PLANNING CRINIE PREVENTION 26 (1976)); Comment, supra
note 5, at 902 and sources cited therein; NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION INsnmum, UNDasrANwom CRM PREVmNoI 3-7 (1986).
161. See generally Bazyler, supra note 18, at 728; Zacharias, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 5.
162. NATIONAL CRIm PREVEnTN INsTrm, supra note 160, at 3; R.L. O'BLcsC, SEcrurv AND C ME PREvEOnI 302-05
(1981); Bazyler, supra note 18, at 733.
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variety of inexpensive measures to eliminate conditions which provide opportunity
for successful criminal attack. For instance, the landowner can eradicate target areas
such as dark, unattended parking lots by increasing lighting and surveillance
measures. 163 Dial-free emergency phones can be installed to increase the probability
of effective apprehension by police.164 The landowner can remove objects which
conceal attackers, such as bushes or trees.' 65 He can also reduce physical barriers to
visibility in general by positioning key areas of access as far away from isolated areas
as possible.166 Such tactics enhance the likelihood of arrest; thus, a landowner can
deter crime by incorporating strategies which make his premises unattractive or
unprofitable to the criminal.' 67
b. Cost-Benefit Analysis
An economic cost-benefit analysis justifies the landowner's duty to guard
against criminal attack. Under this approach, legal liability is warranted when the
expected costs of failing to adopt security measures outweigh the burden of taking the
precaution. 168 The expected costs are determined by evaluating the dollar magnitude
of the potential loss (i.e., the amount the landowner would be required to pay in
victim compensation) multiplied by the probability of criminal attack.169 It is only
when this sum is greater than the cost of precautions necessary to guard against this
risk that imposition of liability is justified. 170 Thus, economic efficiency will dictate
when the imposition of a legal duty will be warranted; recognition of a duty is
necessary when forces in the private marketplace do not promote optimal safety
precautions. 171
In allocating losses resulting from failure to implement reasonable security
measures, economic theory posits that the party who is best able to prevent the loss
should bear the consequences of his failure to do so.' 72 Utilizing a pragmatic
approach, it is apparent that the landowner is in the best position to prevent attacks.
The owner has access to more information about the crime problem than does any
individual. 173 Moreover, as a commercial proprietor, she is best able to accurately
assess relative costs and benefits of proposed security measures. 174 Patrons of
commercial establishments are likely to be relatively uninformed of the extent of the
163. NATIONAL CR ME PREVENTION I srmm, supra note 160, at 113-14; R.L. O'BLOcK, supra note 162, at 314-17.
164. NAT'oNAL CRIME PRVENTIO4 IN surE, supra note 160, at 127.
165. Id. at 113-14.
166. Id. at 122.
167. Id. at 3.
168. See generally R. Posm, Eco.o.%Ic ANALYS oF LAw 147-48 (3d ed. 1986).
169. Id. at 147.
170. Id. at 148. This formula prescribes the level of optimal accident avoidance and reflects Learned Hand's classic
analysis: "[Tihe owner's duty . . . to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability [of harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury... ; (3) the burden of adequate precautions." U.S. v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
171. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 703-04, 707. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
172. G. CA.AEmsI, THE CosTs or Accm sr 26 (1970); Note, supra note 128, at 1135.
173. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 171, at 1096; Note, supra note 128, at 1134-35; Zacharias, supra note 17,
at 705-06.
174. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 171, at 1096-97; see also Zacharias, supra note 17, at 705-06.
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crime problem.' 75 Even though media accounts of victim attacks are frequently
disseminated, an occasional or one-time patron unfamiliar with the locale may be
completely unaware of the pervasiveness of the problem. Even local patrons will
most likely possess only a general awareness of hazardous conditions.' 76 A
landowner, on the other hand, will be apprised of very specific details regarding the
type of criminal activity on or near her premises.1 77 More significant than the
landowner's access to information, however, is the fact that the landowner is
uniquely situated to implement security measures on a premises-wide basis. In
exercising control over the land, the possessor is better able to effectively combat the
threat of attack. 178 The landowner can install additional security devices, employ
security guards, or adopt alternative modes of operation in order to deter crime. 179
Conversely, individual patrons possess only a limited range of choices available to
minimize their exposure to attack. '80
The single most effective choice available to the patron is to simply remain at
home. 18 1 In most instances, this is neither a desirable nor feasible means of
combatting the problem. An individual's fear-motivated refusal to go out at night is
not an effective means of deterring crime.' 82
Of course, customers may always refuse to shop at establishments which pose
a particularly apparent risk of criminal attack. 183 Ideally, fewer customers will
patronize businesses which have inadequate security, opting instead to frequent
establishments which employ superior security tactics. The decline in patronage
experienced by a negligent landowner will generate higher prices for his goods;'84 as
prices increase, the demand for his products will decline.' 85 Consequently, enter-
prises failing to provide security will be forced to adopt precautionary measures or
will eventually be driven out of business. 186 Market theory in its pure form thereby
suggests that judicial intervention in the form of a legal duty is unwarranted. 87
However, two significant distinctions must be drawn. First, the market theory
175. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 745-46; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 171, at 1096 ("In the absence of certainty
as to whether a benefit is worth its costs to society, . . . the cost should be put on the party best located to make such
a cost benefit analysis.") (emphasis added); Zacharias, supra note 17, at 706; Note, supra note 128, at 1135.
176. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 706.
177. Id. at 745 ("Storeowners have superior knowledge of specific dangers near specific stores. ); Bazyler,
supra note 18, at 746.
178. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 741; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 745.
179. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 748. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
180. Individuals can always carry whistles, mace, or other repellants to protect themselves. They can also refuse to
walk alone at night. These measures should be encouraged; however, they are not adequate in and of themselves.
Moreover, individuals may attempt to carry weapons to ward off the threat of successful criminal attack. See U.S. DEr.
OF JusTicE, BuaRAu OF JusmcE STATISTICS, supra note 159, at 182-83 (11% of those surveyed carried a weapon as a crime
prevention measure). Leaving the burden of crime prevention solely on individual patrons may have undesirable
consequences; if individuals are forced to resort to self-help measures of this kind, the crime rate may actually increase.
181. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 747-48.
182. Id.; W. SKoGAN & M. MAXFtED, supra note 157, at 48-49; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 735.
183. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 745.
184. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. Rev. 665, 669 (1985); see generally G.
CALAsa.st, supra note 172.
185. Owen, supra note 184, at 669.
186. Id.
187. Id. See also Zacharias, supra note 17, at 703-04.
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assumes adequate consumer information. 188 As discussed previously, consumers
simply may not possess a level of information sufficient to make discriminating
choices. 189 Second, and more importantly, the market theory assumes that individuals
do indeed have a meaningful choice to shop elsewhere. Individuals living in
high-crime neighborhoods may be faced with the choice of shopping at two or more
neighborhood establishments, each of which poses an equal degree of risk. It is
unrealistic to expect individuals of limited means and mobility' 90 to travel a
significant distance to shop at a more security-conscious establishment. From a
practical standpoint, the cost of travel, in terms of both time and expense, is likely
to outweigh the benefits to an individual residing in a high-crime area. Clearly,
society's cost in imposing the burden on individuals, rather than landowners, is
significant. 191 Since the market mechanism for eliminating high-risk establishments
is unlikely to be effective under these circumstances, judicial intervention is
warranted. 192
Economic analysis also supports imposing a duty on landowners to guard against
criminal attack for two additional reasons. First, the losses resulting from criminal
attack on a landowner's premises should be allocated to the category of people who
are best able to insure against such losses. 193 Landowners, engaged in commercial
operations for profit, clearly are best suited to insure. Landowners are better able to
widely disperse the cost of security and insurance. 194 Hence, the cost of crime is
allocated pro rata among the broad class of potential victims, the patrons, instead of
among a select class of individuals, the actual victims of attack.195
Second, economic theory allocates burdens on those who are in a position to
pass along part of the cost to purchasers. 196 Again, landowners are uniquely situated
to distribute costs in this manner. 197 Loss allocation on this basis is sound in one
respect: patrons who benefit from products or services should be required to pay the
costs necessary in making the goods or services available. 198 However, passing the
costs of the duty on to the patron can be devastating in some instances. Since the
crime problem is more severe in urban areas, 199 individuals forced to live in these
high-crime areas are most in need of crime-deterring measures. These patrons in
general are least able to afford the cost of increased security. 20o Prohibitive costs may
188. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 171, at 1094-95; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 705.
189. See supra note 175-77 and accompanying text.
190. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 745 (shoppers may not be as mobile as functional analysis assumes).
191. See Bazyler, supra note 18, at 747-50; Note, supra note 128, at 1135.
192. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 707.
193. G. Cs.ALAnsi, supra note 172, at 50-51.
194. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 745.
195. Id. at 704; Note, supra note 128, at 1135.
196. G. CALABRzs, upra note 172, at 50-51.
197. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 704; Comment, supra note 5, at 907-08; Note, supra note 128, at 1135.
198. Owen, supra note 184, at 670.
199. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
200. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 705. See also Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 591, 186 A.2d
291, 298 (1962) (In rejecting proposed duty to provide police protection, court observed that the increased cost will be
passed along to tenants in the housing authority. The court stated that "[the burden should be upon the whole community
and not upon the segment of the citizenry which is least able to bear it.").
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eliminate marginally profitable businesses from these areas. 20' Moreover, low-
income patrons should not be forced to choose between absorbing the cost of security
or risking the loss of local availability of goods and services. In response to this
compelling argument, several commentators have observed that the public sector will
be forced to take increased action if forces in the marketplace drive merchants out of
high-crime areas. 20 2 Furthermore, the proposed liability on the landowner is not
absolute; landowners will be held accountable for failure to implement reasonable
security measures, most of which do not involve debilitating operating costs. 20 3
Liability will not be imposed for the failure to eliminate the risk of crime
altogether. 2o4
c. "Fairness" Analysis
Imposing a duty to guard against criminal attack has been criticized on principles
of fairness by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Goldberg v. Housing Authority of
Newark.20 5 In Goldberg, the plaintiff was beaten and robbed while delivering milk to
a tenant at defendant's housing project. 206 The New Jersey Supreme Court found no
duty to provide police protection 207 based on an analysis of the relationship of the
parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.203 The
court rejected an analysis which would turn on the issue of foreseeability and instead
relied on evaluating the fairness of the proposed duty.209 In concluding that the
imposition of a duty would be unfair, the court focused on the vagueness of both the
duty and the standard of performance. 2t 0 This argument, however, does not justify a
refusal to recognize a landowner's duty to guard against criminal attack. Once a duty
is clearly recognized, community standards will evolve to reduce the degree of
201. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 705; Comment, supra note 5, at 907-09.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 162-67, 191 and accompanying text.
204. See Miles v. Flor-Line Assoc., 442 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 1983) (recognizing that mere occurrence of crime
does not result in finding a breach of landowner's duty to provide reasonable protection where adequate security measures
had been taken). See also infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
205. 38 N.J. 578. 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
206. Id., 186 A.2d 291.
207. Note that the Goldberg court was asked to recognize a duty to provide police protection, which must be
distinguished from the duty to provide security. The duty to provide police protection raises a host of policy considerations
distinct from those raised here. Such concerns include the statutory nature of the power vested in the government to
establish a police force, and the highly specialized nature of the police function. Id. at 587, 186 A.2d at 296.
208. Id. at 581, 186 A.2d at 293.
209. Id., 186 A.2d at 293.
210. Id. at 588, 186 A.2d at 297. "Fairness ordinarily requires that a man be able to ascertain in advance of ajury's
verdict whether the duty is his and whether he has performed it ...but how can one know what measures will protect
against the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the psychopath and psychotic?" Id., 186 A.2d at 297.
In support of the Goldberg court's vagueness rationale, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has also stated, "While it
may not seem unfair in the light of public sentiment and social policy in Washington, D.C. to impose upon landlords the
duty of protecting against criminal acts, in our opinion it is patently unfair and unjust to impose the vague duty of Section
344 Restatement of Torts (Second) on the shopkeepers and merchants of Tennessee, . . . for the sudden criminal acts
of unknown and unidentified persons." Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. 1975). The Cornpropst court
went on to hold that the occurrence of prior similar incidents is not sufficient to give rise to the duty; rather, the landowner
must be aware that criminal acts are occurring or are about to occur prior to imposing liability. See supra note 75.
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uncertainty.211 Moreover, explicit guidelines can be formulated, either in judicial
decisions or by legislative pronouncement,212 to further clarify what measures will
satisfy the duty.
Critics also argue that imposing liability for inadequate security is unfair because
private parties are required to guard against actions beyond their control.2 13 This
criticism fails to acknowledge that societal interests play an important role in shaping
legal policy. The imposition of a legal duty may be justified by social considerations
which influence loss allocation;2 14 for instance, Rowland v. Christian2t5 sets forth a
number of considerations which must be evaluated in determining whether a
particular duty should be imposed.2 16 Most notable among these factors is the policy
of preventing future harm and the consequences to the community that a liability rule
would generate. 21 7 A legal rule which requires landowners to guard against criminal
attack, although imperfect in some respects, best advances societal goals.21 8
For example, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach promotes valuable
societal objectives by encouraging the implementation of security measures. If the
occurrence of a prior similar incident is necessary before the duty arises, the
landowner will have no incentive to provide security until such an attack occurs. In
essence, the landowner will receive the benefit of "one free attack." 219 A failure to
extend the duty to landowners would therefore abrogate society's interest in
preventing future harm by discouraging voluntary security practices. 220 Imposition of
the duty provides an incentive to landowners to help minimize the crime problem. 22'
Without such a duty, a conscientious landowner who voluntarily elects to adopt
security measures may subject himself to a risk of liability greater than that of a
landowner who implements no security measures whatsoever. 222 By voluntarily
undertaking the duty, a landowner may be held liable for failure to properly carry out
the undertaking on much the same theory as one is held liable for negligently
undertaking to rescue. 223 Recognition of the duty alleviates the paradoxical outcome
fostered by a sweeping rule of no liability. Finally, the incentive to reduce the crime
problem also answers any argument based on the patron's assumption of the risk. One
211. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 17, at 741 (liability rule would "decrease the ambiguity of the current law by
providing a norm, or prescription of appropriate conduct"); Comment, supra note 5, at 909-10.
212. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. 1975); Comment, supra note 5, at 889.
214. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); See supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
215. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
216. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
217. Id., 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
218. The use of tort-imposed rules of duty to remedy societal goals has recently come under attack by advocates of
tort-reform. One commentator has observed that "[t]he California Supreme Court has arguably pushed tort law past its
ability to solve social problems in a variety of contexts." Owens, supra note 184, at 675 n.50 (citing authority).
219. Comment, supra note 5, at 905.
220. Id.; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 740.
221. Id.
222. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 741.
223. Id. See also W. PRossus & P. KEEroN, supra note 2, §56, at 378 (Even in the absence of a duty, "if the
defendant does attempt to aid him, . . .he is regarded as entering voluntarily into a relation which is attended with
responsibility. . . .Such a defendant will then be liable for a failure to use reasonable care for the protection of the
plaintiff's interest.").
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such argument reasons that a landowner located in a high-crime area should not be
forced to make his premises safer than surrounding areas. 224 If the patron knows that
the level of crime in a community is high, it is argued, no liability should attach
because the patron has assumed the risk of attack merely in venturing out. 225 Such a
rule is unacceptable because it adopts an intolerable degree of apathy by refusing to
deal with the crime problem. A landowner should not be relieved of the duty to
improve the safety of his premises simply because surrounding premises are also
unsafe.
The nature of the business inviter/invitee relationship further undermines the
persuasiveness of criticisms on the grounds of fairness. First, the commercial
landowner is deriving benefit from the patron's presence at his establishment. 226 In
return, an individual expects some minimal degree of protection once the owner's
invitation to enter the establishment is accepted. 227 Second, the Isaacs decision notes
that commercial establishments, by their very nature, attract crime. 228 In maintaining
premises that attract crime, it cannot be said that the landowner has done nothing
"wrong" such that the imposition of liability is unjustified. 229 In fact, even courts
which have adopted an extremely restrictive view of the landowner's duty to guard
against criminal attack have implicitly premised their view on the assumption that the
landowner has done nothing to create a risk of attack. 230 Thus, liability may be
justified even under this narrow view if the landowner's failure to provide security
"attracts or provides a climate for crime." '231
A final attack centers upon the proper function of private enterprises in
preventing crime. The Goldberg analysis justifiably recognizes that some crimes will
be committed notwithstanding the adequacy of the landowner's protection. 232 In
effect, the burden of guarding against criminal attack is shifted away from the victim
and the government, and instead placed on the landowner. This result has been
challenged as placing the responsibility for crime prevention on landowners who are
no better able than the police to bear such a burden. 233 However, this line of
reasoning again attempts to ignore the severity of community crime. The need for
cooperative efforts among citizens, businesses, and government cannot be over-
224. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 647, 281 S.E.2d 36, 43 (1981) (Carlton, J.,
dissenting).
225. Id., 281 S.E.2d at 43.
226. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 741; Zacharias, supra note 17, at 709.
227. Bazyler, supra note 18, at 746.
228. 38 Cal. 3d at 129, 695 P.2d at 661, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364 ("In the very operation of an allnight convenience
store, defendants may be said to have created an 'especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct,' thus
increasing the foreseeability of injury resulting from third party misconduct .. ") (citations omitted).
229. See RSTAT hiENr (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 302 comment n (1965) (liability may be warranted for creating a
"situation or temptation to third persons to commit more serious forms of misconduct"); Zacharias, supra note 17, at
707-09, 745; Note, supra note 128, at 1134-35.
230. See, e.g., Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975) ("There is no duty upon the owners or
operators of a shopping center, individually or collectively, or upon merchants and shopkeepers generally, whose mode
of operation of their premises does not attract or provide a climate for crime, to guard against the criminal acts of a third
party .... ") (emphasis added).
231. Id.
232. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 588, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962) ("The topic presupposes
that inevitably crimes will be committed notwithstanding the sufficiency of the force.").
233. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 708; Comment, supra note 5, at 889.
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looked. The responsibility for crime protection lies with all members of the
community, the private as well as the public sector. 234 Commercial proprietors should
not be absolved of this duty simply because they alone cannot prevent the risk of
criminal attack altogether. Community-wide efforts are essential to make strides
toward a "more secure collective physical environment."235 The minimal burden that
a duty to provide protection imposes on the landowner is far outweighed by the value
to society of imposing it.236
d. Legal Concerns
The most significant challenge to adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach lies with the fear of unlimited landowner liability. This criticism is premised
upon the jury's perceived tendency to compensate the innocent victim of a criminal
attack. 237 In addition to the traditional checks in the judicial system, 238 adequate
restraining factors are present in the cause of action itself to prevent landowner
liability for the mere occurrence of an attack. In particular, the element of
causation 239 poses a significant barrier to the risk of unlimited landowner liability.
Even if foreseeable attack gives rise to the landowner's duty to provide security, the
plaintiff must still demonstrate that the lack of security caused or was a substantial
factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injury before recovery will be awarded. 24°
Recently, California courts have limited landowner liability by focusing on causa-
tion. 241 Thus, a significant increase in landowner liability has not resulted since
Isaacs abandoned the prior similar incidents rule and subjected more cases to jury
consideration. 242
A final legal concern focuses upon the proliferation of cases that a new rule of
duty would generate. 243 The large volume of tort litigation, coupled with already
overburdened court dockets, has been advanced as a practical rationale to explain
234. See NAlONAL CPa-sE PREvENo. INsTrrum, supra note 160, at 112-13.
235. Id. at 113.
236. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d at 31, 695 P.2d at 662, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365
("The foresecability of an assault was high in comparison to the minimal burden on the hospital to take security
measures. ... ).
In discussing the proposed burden on the defendant, the court also observed that "minimal precautions are certain
to have an appreciable effect in preventing crimes in warning patrons. . . . Such minimal measures would not place an
onerous burden upon the defendant or society." Id. at 129, 695 P.2d at 660, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 363, quoting Gomez v.
Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632-33, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 607 (1983).
Moreover, the duty may also serve a dual purpose. For instance, adequate lighting in parking areas is an essential
element in discharging the duty to provide protection against criminal attack. This same security measure, however, may
also be useful in dispensing a duty that has long been imposed on the landowner, the duty to exercise reasonable care to
make the premises safe. See supra note 113. By increasing lighting, a landowner may be able simultaneously to guard
against the risk of a patron tripping over an unseen cement block, for example, as well as the risk from acts of third parties.
237. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 21.
240. See generally W. PeossER & P. K.EToN, supra note 2, § 41, at 265-72.
241. See, e.g., Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 944, 220 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1985);
Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 912, 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1985).
242. See cases cited supra note 241. See also Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.
1986) (Parking lot owner not held liable for criminal attack, even when evidence of prior similar incidents was presented;
in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, court found insufficient evidence of foreseeability.).
243. Zacharias, supra note 17, at 699.
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court refusal to extend the duty to landowners. 244 Where a compelling need for
redress exists, foreclosing access to the judicial system is not an appropriate response.
Furthermore, as the contours of the duty become increasingly clear through judicial
and legislative refinement, fewer cases will actually proceed to trial.
V. PROPOSALS
The preceding discussion of policy implications suggests that, on balance,
society's overall interests are best served by requiring landowners to guard against
criminal attack. However, the duty also creates many troubling side effects. It is the
purpose of this section to propose several ways to minimize the effects produced by
an unqualified duty to guard against criminal attack.
The most important consideration in implementing the duty is to preserve the
distinction between reasonable, as opposed to adequate, landowner action. Under the
proposed duty, the landowner will be required to take reasonable steps to guard
against criminal attack, not to provide adequate deterrence against all criminal
conduct.245 Distinguishing between "reasonable" and "adequate" security measures
will thereby reduce the threat of unlimited landowner liability. The jury's attention
will be focused away from determining whether particular measures were "ade-
quate, "246 and will instead determine whether the measures were "reasonable." 24 7
For example, a landowner should not be held liable for failure to hire the five armed
guards which the plaintiff asserts are necessary to provide adequate protection against
the threat of criminal attack, if the landowner has acted reasonably by at least
providing sufficient lighting and other inexpensive deterrents. Conceptualizing the
duty in terms of minimal precautions, consistent with the realities of the commercial
environment, will help prevent imposing unreasonable burdens on landowners.
Furthermore, the legislature can clearly define the scope of the landowner's
obligation by prescribing specific mandatory safety standards such as lighting or
dial-free emergency phones248 which must be implemented. 249 Another means to
reduce any perceived unfairness in holding the landowner liable is a legislatively-
mandated cap on liability. 250 There is nothing to preclude the legislature from
244. Id. at 702.
245. Even the police are unable to provide an "adequate" deterrence to criminal conduct. Thus, if landowners were
required to provide adequate deterrence, then many of the unfair side effects previously discussed would ensue, and the
landowner would indeed become an "insurer of the patron's safety."
246. See supra note 110. See also 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 172
Cal. Rptr. 528 (1981).
It would be intolerable and grossly unfair to permit a lay jury, after the fact, to determine in any case that
security measures were "inadequate," especially in light of the fact that the decision would always be rendered
in a case where the security had in fact proved to be inadequate.
Id. at 905-06, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
247. In evaluating reasonableness, the jury will be required to consider the relative costs of the security measures.
Thus, the presence of several armed guards at a small establishment most likely will be economically unfeasible;
therefore, the landowners failure to provide the guards will not be unreasonable under the circumstances if other,
less-costly methods have been utilized by the landowner.
248. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
250. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 737 n.212.
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responding to a tort-imposed duty by limiting the magnitude of the risk of liability. 25t
Such a legislative response would permit courts to require minimal security measures
through imposition of a duty, yet miminize the undesirable consequences brought
about by the threat of large verdicts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a landowner is charged with an affirmative duty to protect
individuals from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts occurring on the premises.
Duty and foreseeability, however, are flexible concepts-the same criminal attack
may be reasonably foreseeable under one set of circumstances and only a remote
possibility under another. The occurrence of prior similar attacks on a landowner's
premises is helpful in assessing whether any given attack was capable of reasonable
anticipation. The issue of foreseeability is a question for the jury; thus, courts should
be skeptical of any blanket rule which automatically prevents questions of fact from
reaching the jury. Therefore, the absence of prior similar incidents should not bar a
plaintiff's case if other evidence exists to establish a genuine issue of foreseeability.
Furthermore, the Isaacs approach evaluates the propriety of the defendant's
conduct in light of all relevant circumstances. The landowner is thereby required to
take reasonable steps to minimize the threat of criminal attack on his premises. Such
an approach recognizes that crime will only be diminished if all facets of society work
together. Placing the burden on landowners, as well as on individuals and govern-
ment, facilitates the effectiveness of the collective effort.
The California Supreme Court decision in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital properly recognized that the presence of prior similar incidents is not
essential to creating a duty in an action against a landowner for criminal acts on the
landowner's property. In light of social, legal, and economic policy, it is urged that
the Ohio Supreme Court adopt a similar view.
Laura DiCola Kulwicki
251. Comprehensive legislation limiting damage awards in the area of medical malpractice provides an apt
illustration. See Rodarmor, The Other Side of Medical Malpractice, 6 CAL. LAw. 38 (March, 1986).
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